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POWER, POLICY, AND THE HYDE AMENDMENT:
ENSURING SOUND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION
OF THE CRIMINAL ATTORNEYS' FEES LAW
The Hyde Amendment' brings something new to criminal
justice. Enacted in late 1997, this law allows federal courts to
award attorneys' fees to prevailing criminal defendants who
show that the position of the United States government was
"vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith." Any awards under this
statute come out of the budget of the particular offending federal
agency, most likely the United States Attorney's Office.
The Hyde Amendment seeks to apply to criminal suits the
well-established procedures and limitations of the Equal Access
to Justice Act (EAJA),2 which provides for similar awards
against the Government in civil suits? The proponents of the
Hyde Amendment mobilized on the perception that the government can be abusive in bringing criminal prosecutions and
thereby devastate the lives of defendants who become financially
ruined over the course of their defense.4 The Hyde Amendment
has been hailed as a victory for defendants' rights, and a timely
response to the abusive acts of government officials. 5
This Note looks beyond the veneer and exposes the Hyde
Amendment as an unequivocal legislative failure to enact law
responsibly and as a threat to the sound functioning of the federal criminal justice system. This assessment rests on two related bases.
First, the Hyde Amendment is a simplistic approach to a
complicated problem. Congress enacted the Amendment hastily
1. Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997). The Hyde Amendment also appears as a note to 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1997).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994).
3. See id,
4. See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
5. See Elkan Abramowitz & Peter Scher, The Hyde Amendment, CHAMPION, Mar.
1998, at 22, 23 ("[T]he Hyde Amendment has put into place a much-needed vehicle
for vindicated criminal defendants to argue that a prosecution was abusive or that
the government had engaged in wrongful conduct.").
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in a highly politicized context of virtually nonexistent opposition,
despite the fact that the statute conflicts with well-established
and fundamental legal doctrines. Further, Congress did not address these conflicts either during the enactment of the statute
or in its ultimate language.
Second, the language of the Hyde Amendment is grossly ambiguous and leaves the judiciary with an impermissible degree of
discretion in defining the scope of the law's application. Consequently, this unbridled judicial discretion to review prosecutorial
decisions and to impose financial penalties upon the United
States Attorneys threatens to weaken the essential function of
the executive branch, i.e., the faithful execution of the laws.6
This Note consists of four sections. The first section examines
the enactment of the Hyde Amendment and exposes the highly
politicized context of its passage. The second section discusses
both Congress's failure to address three fundamental legal doctrines that directly conflict with the implementation of the Hyde
Amendment, and the effect of this failure on judicial interpretation of the statute.
The third section discusses recent district court decisions in
which the courts erroneously approached the interpretation of
the Hyde Amendment's procedural and substantive provisions.
This section also addresses the particular dangers to law enforcement posed by an expansive judicial application of this law.
The fourth section recommends various avenues for legislative
action that will circumvent the dangers discussed above. In
addition, this section introduces a model approach to judicial interpretation that will ensure that courts do not perpetuate the
failings of Congress to address the conceptual and doctrinal
problems implicated by the Hyde Amendment.
A LEGISLATIVE FOLLY
This section discusses the enactment of the Hyde Amendment.
It provides a general factual summary of its provisions followed
by an examination of the Amendment's legislative history. After
a critical discussion of the political context in which this legisla-

6. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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tion was passed, this section concludes that Congress enacted
the Hyde Amendment without due consideration of its consequences.
Enactment of the Hyde Amendment
In its entirety, the Hyde Amendment provides:
During fiscal year 1998 and in any fiscal year thereafter, the
court, in any criminal case (other than a case in which the
defendant is represented by assigned counsel paid for by the
public) pending on or after the date of the enactment of this
Act, may award to a prevailing party, other than the United
States, a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation expenses, where the court finds that the position of the United
States was vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith, unless the
court finds that special circumstances make such an award
unjust. Such awards shall be granted pursuant to the procedures and limitations (but not the burden of proof) provided
for an award under section 2412 of title 28, United States
Code [EAJA]. To determine whether or not to award fees and
costs under this section, the court, for good cause shown, may
receive evidence ex parte and in camera (which shall include
the submission of classified evidence or evidence that reveals
or might reveal the identity of an informant or undercover
agent or matters occurring before a grand jury) and evidence
or testimony so received shall be kept under seal. Fees and
other expenses awarded under this provision to a party shall

be paid by the agency over which the party prevails from any
funds made available to the agency by appropriation. No new
appropriations shall be made as a result of this provision.7
Representative Henry Hyde (R-fll.) introduced this law as a
rider to an appropriations bill for the Departments of Commerce,
Justice, and State.8 After thirty minutes of floor. debate, and de-

7. Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997).
8. See 143 CONG. REC. H7786, H7790-91 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1997) (statement of
Rep. Skaggs). The original version, introduced by Representative Hyde and approved
by the House of Representatives, differed from the final legislation in two important
respects. First, the standard for awards was not whether the Government was
"vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith," but rather, whether "the position of the United
States was substantially justified." Id. at H7791. Second, the original version placed
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spite the lack of any hearings or committee reports concerning
the impact of the proposal,9 the House of Representatives passed
the amendment by an overwhelming, bipartisan vote of 340-84. l"
The language of the original measure changed' in conference
committee to ameliorate the intense opposition of the Department of Justice. 2 Virtually no record exists respecting the
changes made between the House's
initial passage of the mea3
sure and its ultimate enactment.'
Debate of the Proposal
The thirty-minute floor debate that immediately preceded the
House vote on the Hyde Amendment constituted the law's only
appreciable legislative history. 14 After introducing the amendment on the floor, Representative Hyde stated the problem the
measure was intended to address:
I have learned in a long life that people do get pushed
around, and they can be pushed around by their government.... I learned that people in government, exercising
government power are human beings, like anybody else, and
they are capable of error, they are capable of hubris, they are
capable of overreaching, and yes, on very infrequent occa-

the burden of proof on the Government and did not contain the language referring
to disclosure and in camera review of evidence relevant to a Hyde Amendment
claim. With respect to the standard for awards and the allocation of the burden of
proof, Rep. Hyde's original proposal mimicked the EAJA. See 28 U.S.C. § 2142
(1994).
9. See 143 CONG. REC. H7849-50 (daily ed. Sept. 25, 1997).
10. See 143 CoNG. REC. H7786, H7791 (statement of Rep. Skaggs).
11. See supra note 8.
12. See infra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.
13. See United States v. Gardner, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1287 (N.D. Okla. 1998)
("There is sparse legislative history with respect to the Hyde Amendment and as yet
no court has rendered an opinion construing its provisions.").
The conference committee report on the appropriations bill attached to the Hyde
Amendment contained but one reference to the measure: "On the Hyde provision, we
have language that we believe is acceptable to all parties, that allows the recovery
of attorneys' fees in criminal cases where the defendant is acquitted where the court
finds that the prosecutor acted vexatiously, frivolously or in bad faith." 143 CoNG.
REc. H10918, H10919 (daily ed. Nov. 13, 1997).
14. See 143 CONG. REC. H7786, H7790-94 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1997). The debate
on the amendment consisted exclusively of statements made by Representatives
Henry Hyde, David Skaggs (D-Colo.), and Susan Rivers (D-Mich.). See id.
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sions they are capable of pushing people around.... If the
Government, your last
resort, is your oppressor, you really
15
have no place to turn.
Narrowing his focus to the actions taken by federal prosecutors, Hyde queried:
What if Uncle Sam sues you, charges you with a criminal
violation, even gets an indictment and proceeds, but they are
wrong. They are not just wrong, they are willfully wrong,
they are frivolously wrong. They keep information from you
that the law says they must disclose. They hide information.
They do not disclose exculpatory information to which you
are entitled. They suborn perjury. They can do anything. But
they lose the litigation, the criminal suit, and they cannot
prove substantial justification. In that circumstance,... you
should be entitled to your attorney's fees reimbursed and the
costs of litigation .... That, my friends, is justice. 16
Representative Hyde further emphasized his concern for the
financial welfare of the prevailing defendants by stating his
belief that "the most unjust thing in all the law" is that after
prevailing in a prosecution the defendant must "swallow what
can be bankrupting costs."1 7
Hyde maintained that his proposal, would do "rough justice"
in these cases by duplicating in criminal cases the remedies
already afforded civil litigants under the EAJA. 8 Hyde stressed
the fact that the EAJA scheme was well-established and that
awards under that law were "modest."19 "[That is the law, and
it has been the law for 17 years. There are cases interpreting it,
interpreting what substantial justification for the Government to
bring the litigation is, and we have had 17 years of successful
interpretation and reinforcement of that law."20 It appears from

15. Id. at H7791.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. The strength of this argument is undercut severely by the later substitution in conference committee of the "substantially justified" standard in favor of
"vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith." See supra note 8. For a discussion concerning
the interpretation of the latter standard, see infra notes 190-231 and accompanying
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these statements that Hyde saw his proposal as a simple solution to a serious problem. 1
Hyde's opponents used their short time during the debate to
dispel the notion that the amendment was sufficiently uncomplicated that further deliberation on the proposal was unnecessary.
Representative Skaggs thought it:
an extraordinary matter of policy to attempt to bring up for
the first time as an amendment to an appropriations bill [a
measure that had] been subject to no hearings, no opportunity for representatives of the Justice Department or the criminal defense bar or anyone else to really explicate the implications, the consequences, the costs of a significant change in
the way the United States of America would manage its criminal justice responsibilities.2
Representative Skaggs agreed that Congress should address the
issue of injustice, "[blut let us do it in the regular order ...with

an opportunity for interested parties to be heard... to make
their case about the real consequences of this kind of very, very
significant change in national policy."" The remarks of Representative Rivers echoed these same concerns. 4 The opposition to
the Hyde Amendment, thus, was not as much a frontal assault

text.
21. See 143 CONG. REC. H7793 (statement of Rep. Hyde) ("This is about as simple
a concept as there is. We have had it and we have been satisfied with it in civil
litigation. I am simply applying the same situation to criminal litigation.").
22. Id. at H7791 (statement of Rep. Skaggs).
23. Id. at H7792 (statement of Rep. Skaggs). This call for caution was based on
the Department of Justice's concern that the attorneys' fees scheme would "have a
profound and harmful impact on the Federal criminal justice system" because it
would, among other things, "create a monetary incentive for criminal defense attorneys to generate additional litigation in cases in which prosecutors have in good
faith brought sound charges, tying up the scarce time and resources that are vital to
bringing criminals to justice." Id. For a discussion of whether awards under the
Hyde Amendment require a showing of subjective bad faith on the part of the Government, see infra notes 209-18 and accompanying text.
24. See 143 CONG. REC. at H7793 (statement of Rep. Rivers) ("Clearly this is not
the sort of proposal that we should pass after just 30 minutes of discussion.").
Representative Rivers further questioned whether there was an actual need for
the Hyde Amendment given the 87% conviction rate by United States Attorneys.
Representative Hyde's response to this salient concern consisted of the curt remark"let us pass this law and then we will have some experience and see how many
cases are brought that they cannot prove substantial justification." Id.
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on the merits of the plan, as it was a call for Congress not to
take a headstrong and overly simplistic approach to a complicated issue.2"
Representative Hyde's response to the opposition's eminently
reasonable argument for restraint was both cursory and rhetorical. Hyde stated that, "[the opposition] takes refuge in procedure, that this is the inappropriate vehicle to bring this forward.
Injustice needs remedy and one seizes their opportunities when
they come along."2 6 After calls for further deliberation went
unheeded, the debate concluded, and the House of Representatives overwhelmingly approved the Hyde Amendment, 340 votes
to 84.27

At first blush, the wide margin by which the Hyde Amendment passed seems to indicate decisive legislative action in curbing abusive government conduct. The foregoing summary of the
legislative record, however, undermines any notion that the
House passed the amendment after a careful consideration of its
implications. The following subsection offers an explanation for
this one-sided outcome through a discussion of the political context in which the Hyde Amendment was passed.
Politicsof Passage
One need only look to the political pedigree of the Hyde
Amendment to understand the legislation's appeal to Congress.
The Hyde Amendment was borne not out of public outcry over
federal prosecutors' harassment of the common man. Rather, it
originated as an initiative designed to protect only a special
minority of Americans: members of Congress and their staff.
In 1996, Representative Joseph McDade (R-Pa) was acquitted
of bribery and racketeering charges after mounting an eight-year
criminal defense. 8 This outcome inspired Representative John
Murtha (D-Pa) to introduce an amendment to the 1997 Coin25. See id. at H7791-94.
26. Id. at H7786, H7792 (statement of Rep. Hyde). This argument is less persuasive considering the fact that Henry Hyde was chairman of the House Judiciary
Committee at the time, a point raised by Representative Skaggs in the debate. See
id. at H7793.
27. See id. at H7786, H7791 (statement of Rep. Skaggs).
28. See Abramowitz & Scher, supra note 5, at 23.
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merce, Justice, and State Departments' appropriations bill that
would allow members of Congress and their staff to recover
attorneys' fees from the Government for wrongful prosecutions.2 9
In an effort to make the measure more equitable, Representative
Henry Hyde, chairman of the House Judiciary Committee, interceded by extending the Murtha Amendment to apply to any
prevailing criminal defendant."° The Hyde Amendment, while
making the language more fair, left intact the Murtha
Amendment's spirit of partisanship. The Hyde Amendment, the
opposition argued, would reserve exclusively to politicians a
claim that their prosecution was "politically motivated" and,
thus, wrongful."' This special benefit of the Hyde Amendment
yields a plausible explanation of the overwhelming congressional
support of the law. 2
A less cynical, and more probable explanation for the strong
support of the Hyde Amendment flows from the pervasive public
and congressional hostility toward federal law enforcement orga29. See 143 CONG. REC. H7786, H7791 (statement of Rep. Hyde).
30. See id.
31. During the floor debate, Representative Rivers lashed out against the Hyde
Amendment on this ground. Responding to Representative Hyde's claim that his
amendment would produce greater equity than Murtha's, Representative Rivers argued:
I believe [the Hyde Amendment], when distilled down, is nothing more
than a variation on the protect Members theme that is already written
into this bill.... Members can and will claim that their prosecution was
politically motivated. The words of [Rep. Hyde] support the suspicion. He
argued ... that there is, quote, a legitimate fear that a prosecutor could
become politically involved with the particular case, could feel so compelled to win that he forgets his duty is not to win but to ensure justice.
143 CONG. REC. H7786, H7792 (1997) (statement of Rep. Rivers). The Hyde
Amendment's protection of politicians raises special concerns in light of the statutory
duty of federal prosecutors to root out the corruption of public officials. See, ag., C.
Keith Hamilton et al., Bribery of Public Officials, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 471 (1993);
Craig C. Sonsanto & Nancy S. Stewart, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Federal Prosecution of
Election Offenses, in CORPORATE POLITICAL ACTIVITIES 1998: COMPLYING WITH CAMPAIGN FINANCE, LOBBYING AND ETHICS LAWS 625, 637 (Practising Law Inst. ed.,

1998). A politician-friendly scheme that imposes financial penalties on prosecutors
may chill the enforcement of these laws. See infra note 97 and accompanying text.
32. Representative Hyde's own words support the "political motivation" argument.
See Mark Johnson, Reimbursement Bill Opposed by Top Prosecutors, TAMPA TRIB.,
Nov. 3, 1997, at 3, available in 1997 WL 13840944 ("There is a legitimate fear that
a federal prosecutor could become politically involved with a particular case...
(quoting Rep. Henry Hyde)).
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nizations existing at the time of the Hyde Amendment's passage.
The tragedies of Waco and Ruby Ridge, the accusations of FBI
misconduct in the "File-gate" imbroglio, and the allegations of
impropriety at the FBI crime lab coalesced to create a perception
that every federal agency was out of control."3 Commentators
branded the FBI as a "dangerous national joke,"' portrayed
federal prosecutors as "a regulatory Gestapo" who hated the
people they served," and lambasted Congress for its failure to
clean out the "criminals" in federal law enforcement agencies. 6
Powerful members of Congress expressed similar sentiments
immediately prior to the House of Representatives's vote on the
Hyde Amendment. Two days before that vote, the Senate Finance Committee opened hearings that publicized certain contemptuous practices of the IRS when dealing with taxpayers.3"
On the first day of these hearings, Senator William V. Roth, Jr.
(R-Del.), the chairman of that committee, asserted that the IRS
"all too frequently acts as if it were above the law.""8 In addition,
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Miss.) portrayed the
agency as having conducted a "reign of terror" against the taxpayers." These statements elucidate the political context in
which Congress considered the Hyde Amendment, and show a
legislature primed to take action, any action, to restrain federal
law enforcement authority in light of the pervasive vilification of
government agencies.
This charged atmosphere weakened the Justice Department's
constituency in Congress because there was little to gain politi-

33. See Paul Craig Roberts, Wider Regulatory Bogs, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1997, at
A14, available in 1997 WL 3685251.
34. Bill Steigerwald, Taking a Swipe at FBI Failings, COM. APPEAL, Aug. 3, 1997,
at G4, available in 1997 WL 11964462.
35. Roberts, supra note 33, at A14.
36. See Laurie Kellman, Probes Have Fallen Short of Promised Results, PHIL&
TiIB., Dec. 2, 1997, at 7A, available in 1997 WL 11719031; Roberts, supra note 33,
at A14.
37. See John Mintz, Hearings on IRS Practices Open, WASH. POST, Sept. 24, 1997,
at A4 (expecting the hearings to show that IRS employees used pseudonyms during
investigations, improperly designated some taxpayers as tax protesters and tricked
taxpayers into signing papers that weakened those taxpayers' legal positions in audits).
38. Id.
39. Id.

342

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:333

cally and much to lose by opposing a measure that was depicted
as keeping abusive prosecutors in check. As a result, the 105th
Congress saw an "unusual alliance" between liberals and conservatives with respect to criminal justice issues.40 Traditionally,
conservatives had been ardent supporters of law enforcement
agencies, with a "core group of civil libertarians" constituting
their opposition. 4 ' The first session of the 105th Congress, however, saw the undermining of this usually stalwart conservative
support because of the firestorm ignited by the discrete, yet
highly publicized, events discussed above.42 Consequently, "[iun a
host of important criminal justice issues-from civil asset forfeiture and oversight of the FBI crime lab to [the Hyde Amendment]-traditional antagonists on the right and left reached
across the political divide to join hands."' This alignment of
conservatives and liberals, compounded by widespread hostility
to federal law enforcement authorities rendered impotent any
calls for a meaningful deliberation of the practical and legal pitfalls of implementing the Hyde Amendment. As a result, Congress overwhelmingly approved the attorneys' fees measure
without full consideration of its consequences.
FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF LAW IGNORED BY CONGRESS

During the only recorded debate on the Hyde Amendment,
Representative Henry Hyde made the following statement as he
introduced the legislation:
We have a law called the Equal.Access to Justice Act, which
provides in a civil case if the Government sues you, and you
prevail.. . you are entitled to have attorney's fees and costs
reimbursed. That is justice.... Now, it occurred to me, if
that is good for a civil suit, why not for a criminal suit?"

Apparently intended to be a rhetorical question, it is nonetheless
a critical one, especially when spoken on the floor of Congress in
40. T.R. Goldman, The Right Discovers Rights, LEGAL TIMES, Dec. 22, 1997, at 9.
41. Id.

42. See id; supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text.
43. Goldman, supra note 40, at 9.
44. 143 CONG. REC. H7786, H7791 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Hyde) (emphasis added).
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the course of passing a provision as unprecedented as the Hyde
Amendment. Congress is expected not only to ask, but to answer
these questions before making important changes in the law.
This section discusses three fundamental legal problems implicated by the Hyde Amendment, but not addressed in its enactment: 1) judicial restraint in authorizing departures from the
American rule and sovereign immunity doctrine; 2) judicial re-

straint in reviewing discretionary decisions of the prosecutor;
and 3) the civil law-criminal law distinction. Each one of these
problems represents an answer to Henry Hyde's question: Why
not?
The purpose of the following discussion is not to point out the
shortcomings of this law for their own sake, but rather to elucidate a serious problem. When Congress passes a statute, yet
ignores conflicts between the legislation and fundamental legal
doctrines, it fails to give the courts the guidance necessary to
interpret those laws. Exclusive judicial reliance on the legislative history of such laws in resolving questions of statutory interpretation only perpetuates this oversight. 4' As a result, courts
are properly hesitant to rely solely on the legislative history of
such laws because it is a deficient authority on which to resolve
doctrinal tensions. 46 In keeping with this argument, the following discussion observes that judicial reliance on the legislative
history of the Hyde Amendment is shortsighted due to
Congress's three-fold failure to address conflicts of fundamental
legal doctrine when enacting this law.
The Hyde Amendment's Departurefrom the American Rule and
Sovereign Immunity Doctrine
Representative Henry Hyde offered the Hyde Amendment as a
criminal law version of the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA),
a law that authorizes the award of attorneys' fees to prevailing
civil litigants against the United States if the position of the
government was not substantially justified.4' An examination of
45. See ANTONIN ScALIA, A MATrER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND

THE LAw 29-37 (1997).
46. See id.
47. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
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the conceptual implications of the Hyde Amendment, therefore,
must be viewed through the lens of the EAJA.
Generally, the EAJA represents a statutory departure from
two long-standing jurisprudential concepts. First, the EAJA, to a
certain extent, abandons the "American rule," which is the common-law view that, win or lose, a litigant must bear the expense
of her own attorney." Second, the EAJA departs from the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity, which bars suits
against the government, unless this immunity is explicitly
waived. 49 The proponents of the Hyde Amendment did not expressly address the tension between the amendment and these
general principles. The best explanation for this alleged oversight is that the 105th Congress resolved this tension by implicitly borrowing the approach taken by the 96th Congress, which
passed the EAJA, through the Hyde Amendment's expressed
adoption of the EAJA's "procedures and limitations."" This answer to the doctrinal conflict is suspect because it promotes a
wholesale substitution of the approach taken to old legislation
for original thinking on current legislation. In other words, this
response assumes that, in the case of the Hyde Amendment, no
new consideration or restrictions were warranted. Were the
differences between the two laws negligible, the tension between
the Hyde Amendment and the American rule and sovereign immunity doctrine might be resolved by adoption of the EAJA
scheme. The EAJA and the Hyde Amendment, however, differ in
fundamental ways including their respective purposes, the degree of caution exhibited by each Congress in passing the laws,
and the areas impacted by each statute. Before further examining the fundamental differences between the Hyde Amendment
and EAJA, a brief review is necessary of the law of awards of
attorneys' fees prior to the EAJA's enactment.

48. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975)
("In the United States, the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect a
reasonable attorneys' fee from the loser."); Henry Cohen, Awards of Attorneys' Fees
Against the United States: The Sovereign Is Still Somewhat Immune, 2 W. NEW ENG.
L. REV. 177, 177 (1979).
49. See Cohen, supra note 48, at 177-79.
50. Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997).
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Pre-EAJA
In England, the common law routinely awarded attorneys'
fees to prevailing litigants in civil suits. 51 In 1796, the Supreme
Court of the United States held that American courts would
follow their own rule in this area; to wit, judges must not, independent of statutory authority, award costs to prevailing parties.52 Since then, Congress has from time to time passed legislation explicitly authorizing departures from the American rule,
but only.to a limited degree.5" In only two specific areas could
federal courts properly award costs beyond the scope of these
statutes.54 A federal court could, pursuant to its inherent power,
award reasonable costs to a prevailing litigant against an entity
who received a common benefit from the litigation,55 or against
the losing party when that party "has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."'56 Prior to the
EAJA, however, the federal government enjoyed sovereign immunity from awards of attorneys' fees, even under the judicial
exceptions of "common benefit" and "bad faith."5"
In response to growing criticism that the American rule was
too restrictive, some courts sought to expand the judicial exceptions to the doctrine. 58 For instance, courts began awarding
attorneys' fees to the prevailing parties in civil litigation that

51. See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 247.
52. See Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 306, 306 (1796) ("The general
practice of the United States is in opposition to [the English rule]; and even if that
practice were not [s]trictly correct in principle, it is entitled to the re[slpect of the
court, till it is changed, or modified, by [sitatute."), quoted in Alyeska Pipeline, 421
U.S. at 249-50 (citing subsequent holdings of the Court consistent with this early
principle).
53. See Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 251-63.
54. See id. at 257-58.
55. See id.; Spencer v. NLRB, 712 F.2d 539, 543 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
56. Spencer, 712 F.2d at 543 (quoting F.D. Rich Co. v. United States, 417 U.S.
116, 129 (1974) (dictum)).
57. See id. at 544 ("[This benefit] derive[s] from two sources: the general doctrine
of sovereign immunity; and 28 U.S.C. § 2412, which, prior to its amendment by the
EAJA, was 'consistently construed as immunizing the United States against
attorney's fees awards absent clear or express statutory authority to the contrary.'"
(quoting NAACP v. Civiletti, 609 F.2d 514, 516 (D.C. Cir. 1979))).
58. See id.
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exception to the American rule was dubbed: the "private attorney general" exception."
In 1975, in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society,6 "the Supreme Court called a halt to this judicially managed doctrinal innovation."6 2 There, the Court reaffirmed its
commitment to the position that judges could not award
attorneys' fees and costs unless specifically authorized to do so
by statute. After an extensive review of the law, the Court explained:
[T]he approach taken by Congress to this issue has been to
carve out specific exceptions to a general rule that federal
courts cannot award attorneys' fees beyond the limits of [the
statute],... courts are not free to fashion drastic new rules
with respect to the allowance of attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in federal litigation or to pick and choose among
plaintiffs... to award fees in some cases but not others,
depending upon the courts' assessment of the importance of
the public policies involved in the particular cases.
Essentially, the Court held that, with respect to further departures from the American rule, Congress must lead and the
courts must follow. In 1980, Congress heeded the Supreme
Court's request for leadership by enacting the EAJA.6 4
The EAJA vs. The Hyde Amendment
The differences between the Hyde Amendment and the EAJA
are so substantial that the 105th Congress's failure to adopt
extensive "Hyde-specific" provisions is unacceptable given the
conflict between the Hyde Amendment's scheme and the American rule and sovereign immunity doctrine. First, the purposes of
the EAJA are markedly different from those of the Hyde Amendment. Both the text and legislative history of the EAJA demonstrate the dual concerns of the 96th Congress in passing the law.

60. Id.
61. 421 U.S. 240 (1975).

62. Spencer, 712 F.2d at 544 (emphasis added).
63. Alyeska Pipeline, 421 U.S. at 269 (emphasis added).

64. Equal Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 94 Stat. 2325 (1980) (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (1994)).
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On the one hand, the EAJA, on its face, seeks to ameliorate the
deterrent effect that discouraged litigants from asserting their
rights in civil suits against the United States.65 The legislative
record demonstrates a congressional finding that the costs incurred when individuals sue or defend against the United States
deters the assertion of claims and defenses.66 The legislative
history also evinces congressional intent to eliminate that ineq67
uity by awarding attorneys' fees and costs to certain parties.
The EAJA remedy is, thus, a response to a specific problem: the
absence of litigation that might otherwise be brought or defended against were attorneys' fees recoverable against the government. As unfashionable as it may sound, a dearth of litigation
can be a bad thing when it results in costs both to the individual, who sacrifices the assertion of his or her legal rights, and to
society, which suffers the effects of a stunted body of law. The
96th Congress recognized these problems and enacted the EAJA
to address them.68
The additional purpose of the EAJA is to fortify the established statutory and common law exceptions to the American
rule.69 Legislative reports discuss the intent of the EAJA to ensure that the government "will be subject to the common law
and statutory exceptions to the American Rule regarding attorney fees. This change will allow a court in its discretion to
award fees against the United States to the same extent it may
presently award such fees against other parties."7 ° In this sense,

65. See Equal Access to Justice Act § 202(c)(1) ("It is the purpose of this title...
(1) to diminish the deterrent effect of seeking review of, or defending against, governmental action by providing in specified situations an award of attorney fees,
expert witness fees, and other costs against the United States ....").
66. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, at 5-6 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984,
4984; H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-1434, at 21 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5003, 5010.
67. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 6, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4984; H.R.
CONF. REP. NO. 96-1434, at 21, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5010.
68. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
69. See Equal Access to Justice Act § 202(c)(2) ("It is the purpose of this title ...
(2) to insure the applicability in actions by or against the United States of the common law and statutory exceptions to the 'American rule' respecting the award of
attorney fees.").
70. H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, at 6, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4984 (emphasis
added).
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the EAJA does not break new ground, but rather, preserves the
exceptions to the American rule that have developed over the
course of a century.
Although it adopts a scheme similar to that of the EAJA, the
Hyde Amendment does not share the purposes of its progenitor.
There is no evidence that the 105th Congress found that the
assertion of legal rights was deterred in the criminal context, for
example, that criminal defendants pled guilty rather than asserting defenses due to the expense of going to trial. Instead, the
Hyde Amendment was concerned solely with satisfying a moral
duty to reimburse prevailing defendants for litigation expenses. 7
Unlike the Hyde Amendment, the individual reimbursement of
costs is a consequence, not a purpose of the EAJA. Furthermore,
the Hyde Amendment's compensation of litigation costs as an
objective is distinct from the "deterrent-diminishing" purposes of
the EAJA. Nor can it be said that the Hyde Amendment reflects
the EAJA's purpose of merely ensuring the applicability of established exceptions to the American rule because no such exceptions existed in the criminal area before the Hyde Amendment. The Hyde scheme of awarding attorneys' fees to prevailing
criminal defendants is unprecedented. v2 The irreconcilable differences between the purposes of these laws cast serious doubt on

71. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. One might argue that an additional
purpose of the Hyde Amendment is to curb the abusive actions of government officials. This is not the case, however, despite rhetoric in the affirmative. The Hyde
Amendment expressly denies its remedy to defendants represented by publicly funded counsel. See Pub. L. No. 105-119, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997). Consequently, prosecutors need not worry about running afoul of the Hyde Amendment when
prosecuting poor people. If the statute were honestly intended to deter the evils of
prosecutorial misconduct, there would be no reasonable cause for this distinction.
With respect to the law's deterrent effect on the prosecutor, there is no substantive
difference between an attorneys' fees award that goes to a private law firm and one
that goes to a public defender's office. Logic suggests that the public should be reimbursed for conducting an unnecessary defense to the same extent as the private
individual. Admittedly, defendants, not lawyers, receive the awards under the
statute, but this distinction lacks substance. Congress could easily have provided a
cause of action for publicly funded legal services and, thereby, retained the principle
of deterrence. The most disturbing aspect of the exemption of indigents from this
purportedly remedial law, however, is that it arbitrarily promotes prosecutions of
this class of persons because in such cases the government is beyond the reach of
the Hyde Amendment.
72. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
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the sufficiency of the 105th Congress's approach to resolving the
American rule/sovereign immunity tension.
Second, the level of consideration in the 96th Congress's passage of the EAJA was substantially greater than that of the
105th Congress's passage of the Hyde Amendment. Prior to its
enactment, the EAJA was the subject of multiple hearings73 and
congressional reports.74 These reports discussed nearly every
aspect of the law, from the purposes of the EAJA and congressional findings7 5 to the definition of the standard for awards
under the law.7 6 Further, Congress placed stringent requirements on recovery under the EAJA, including: net-worth limitations on who may recover fees,7 7 a thirty-day time limit for filing
a claim,78 and an hourly rate cap for attorneys' fees. 79 Most telling of the cautious approach of the 96th Congress was the inclusion of a sunset provision, which stated that the EAJA would be
automatically repealed after three years. 80 These considerations
reflect a conscientious legislature, one that was mindful of the
issues implicated by the law they sought to pass and was careful
to strike the appropriate balance between innovation and established doctrine.
The enactment of the Hyde Amendment, however, indicates
no such restraint or judgment. No reports, hearings, or substantive debate informed the enactment of the amendment.8 1 The
legislative record of the Hyde Amendment is limited to a highly
rhetorical argument in support of the law that evades criticism
rather than addressing its substance.8 2 The only guidance provided as to the standard for awards by the floor debate of the
amendment was negated when the standard changed in confer-

73. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 6-8, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4984-87.
74. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4984; H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 96-1434, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5003.
75. See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1418, at 5-8, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 4984-87.
76. See id. at 10-11, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CA.N. at 4988-90.
77. See Equal Access to Justice Act § 204(a), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B) (1994).
78. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B).
79. See id. § 2412(d)(2)(A)(ii).
80. See Equal Access to Justice Act § 204(c), repealed by Pub. L. No. 99-80, §
6(b)(2), 99 Stat. 186 (1985).
81. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
82. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
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ence committee.83 Further, although it adopts the "procedures
and limitations" of the EAJA, the Hyde Amendment fails to
explain how inclusively this clause should be interpreted.' The
amendment's most conspicuous omission, however, is that of a
sunset provision, which would have authorized application of the
statute for a fixed period, followed by its automatic repeal. In
short, the failure of the 105th Congress to consider the Hyde
Amendment to a comparable degree as its EAJA predecessors
further invalidates the former's approach to resolve "by substitution"85 the American rule and sovereign immunity tension.
Finally, the EAJA and the Hyde Amendment differ remarkably with respect to the policy areas affected by each law.
Whereas the EAJA represents the next step in the continuing
development of attorneys' fees awards in civil litigation, the
Hyde Amendment is an unprecedented foray into the criminal
law. As discussed above, with respect to the level of consideration of its attorneys' fees statute, the 105th Congress failed to
emulate the 96th Congress. This failure is even more serious in
light of the novelty of the Hyde Amendment scheme with its illconsidered impact on issues of criminal procedure, none of which
are implicated by the EAJA.8 6 Because the Hyde Amendment
affects matters not even remotely implicated by the EAJA, the
former law's naked substitution of the latter's approach to resolving issues of doctrinal conflict is fallacious.
Summary
The foregoing differences between the EAJA and the Hyde
Amendment demonstrate the insufficiency of the 105th
Congress's approach to resolving the conflict between the Hyde
Amendment and the American rule and sovereign immunity
doctrine. As a consequence, no indication exists that Congress
contemplated these principles during the enactment of the Hyde
Amendment. Certainly, the legislative record shows no balancing

83. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
84. For a discussion of the implications of this failure, see infra notes 176-81 and
accompanying text.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 47-50.
86. See infra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
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of the role of established doctrines against the need for departure from such rules. Nor does it guide courts in reconciling the
goal of the Hyde Amendment with the Supreme Court's holding
in Alyeska Pipeline that Congress, not the courts, must strike
the balance when departing from the American rule and sovereign immunity doctrine. For this reason, the legislative record is
of little help to courts when interpreting the provisions of the
Hyde Amendment.
Unfortunately, the American rule and sovereign immunity
doctrine are not the only conflicting, constitutive legal theories
ignored by the Hyde Amendment's enactment and, thus, they
are not the only grounds on which to refute the value of its legislative history to subsequent judicial interpretation of the statute. The Hyde Amendment also collides with the doctrine of
separation of powers, which the Supreme Court has consistently
interpreted as prohibiting the judicial branch from reviewing the
discretionary acts of the executive branch.8"
Separation of Powers: Prosecutorial Discretion, Judicial
Restraint, and the Hyde Amendment
The Hyde Amendment authorizes federal courts to review the
nature and quality of the decisions made by executive agencies,
especially prosecutor's offices, in determining whether the position of the government was "vexatious, frivolous, or in bad
faith."88 Henry Hyde viewed the amendment as a means by
which to check the actions of overzealous prosecutors. 89 He
placed great confidence in the ability of judges to decide properly
when to penalize objectionable conduct on the part of the executive.9" Despite their good intentions, however, the proponents of

87. In Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1967), then Judge Burger observed that li]t follows, as an incident of the constitutional separation of
powers, that the courts are not to interfere with the free exercise of the discretionary power of the attorneys of the United States in their control over criminal prosecutions." Id. at 481.
88. See infra notes 219-31 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
90. See 143 CONG. REC. H7786, H7793 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1997) (statement of
Rep. Hyde) ("[Tihe judge makes the decision; the U.S. attorney does not, the jury
does not. The judge who has heard the case has heard all the evidence.").
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the Hyde Amendment failed to recognize that these aims are in
direct conflict with longstanding principles that have been consistently upheld by the Supreme Court regarding judicial review
of prosecutorial decisions. Any analysis of the Hyde Amendment
must be viewed in the context of these precedents.
In Wayte v. United States,9 a criminal defendant challenged
the decision of the United States Attorney to prosecute him for
his failure to register for selective service. The defendant alleged
that he was unconstitutionally singled out for prosecution because of his outspoken opposition to the draft. 92 The trial court
dismissed the charges, but the court of appeals reversed the trial
court's decision.9 3 Approaching the issue of selective prosecution,
the Supreme Court prefaced its analysis with this summary of
the constitutional role of the prosecutor:
In our criminal justice system, the Government retains
"broad discretion" as to whom to prosecute. "[S]o long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused
committed an offense defined by statute, the decision whether
or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a
grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion."94
The Court then turned its attention to the proper role of the
courts in reviewing prosecutorial decisions and asserted that,
"[t]his broad discretion rests largely on the recognition that the
decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review."95 The Court noted several factors involved in prosecutorial
decisions that "are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis
the courts are competent to undertake."9 6 In short, the Court
raised doubts as to ability of courts to review prosecutors' discretionary decisions.
The belief that judicial review of these decisions would be
inadequate was but one cause for the Court's concern over in-

91. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
92. See id. at 604.
93. See id. at 604-06.
94. Id. at 607 (citations omitted) (quoting Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357,
364 (1978)).
95. Id.
96. Id.
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terference with separation of powers. The Court recognized:
Judicial supervision in this area, moreover, entails systemic
costs of particular concern. Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law
enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and
decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government's enforcement policy. All these are substantial concerns that make the
courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to
prosecute."7
Recognition of these pitfalls led the Court to permit selective
prosecution claims only in limited circumstances, specifically
those involving suspect classifications such as race or religion.9"
Two years after this decision, the Supreme Court revisited the
subject of the respective roles of the prosecutor and the courts.
In Town of Newton v. Rumery, 99 respondent faced criminal
charges of witness tampering and entered into a release-dismissal agreement with a prosecutor. The agreement provided that
the respondent would give up a related civil rights claim against
the government in exchange for dismissal of the pending criminal charges. 0 0 The respondent subsequently attacked the validity of such agreements on public policy grounds, arguing that
these10 agreements were improper uses of prosecutorial discretion. '
In rejecting the respondent's argument that courts should
invalidate release-dismissal agreements, the Supreme Court
renewed its deferential stance toward claims of improper
prosecutorial conduct. Citing Wayte and related cases, the Court
elaborated:
Our decisions in those cases uniformly have recognized that
courts normally must defer to prosecutorial decisions as to
whom to prosecute. The reasons for judicial deference are
well known. Prosecutorial charging decisions are rarely sim-

97. Id. at 607-08.
98. See id. at 608.

99. 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
100. See id. at 390.
101. See id. at 391.
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ple. In addition to assessing the strength and importance of a
case, prosecutors also must consider other tangible and intangible factors, such as government enforcement priorities. Finally, they also must decide how best to allocate the scarce
resources of a criminal justice system that simply cannot
accommodate
the litigation of every serious criminal
10 2
charge.
As it did in Wayte, the Court concluded that "[blecause these
decisions 'are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the
courts are competent to undertake,' we have been 'properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute.'' °3
Recently, the Supreme Court reinforced the rule requiring
judicial deference to prosecutorial decisions. In United States v.
Armstrong,"4 the Court was called upon to set the threshold
necessary to obtain discovery in a selective prosecution claim
alleging improper use of the prosecutor's charging authority.' 5
In refusing to set a low standard for such claims, the Court cited
the now familiar language of Wayte in its effort to clarify further
the rationale for judicial restraint:
The Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain
"broad discretion" to enforce the Nation's criminal laws. They
have this latitude because they are designated by statute as
the President's delegates to help him discharge his constitutional responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed." U.S. Const., Art. II, § 3; . . . . As a result, "[tihe
presumption of regularity supports" their prosecutorial decisions and, "in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary,
courts presume that they have properly discharged their
official duties." 6
The constitutional presumption required by the separation of
powers doctrine, however, was not the only factor relevant to the
Court's analysis. Once again, the Court doubted the competence
of courts to second-guess prosecutorial decisions.0 7 The
102. Id. at 396 (citation omitted).
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607-08).
517 U.S. 456 (1996).
See id. at 458.
Id. at 464 (citations omitted).
See id. at 465 ("Judicial deference to the decisions of [prosecutors] rests in
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Armstrong decision represents yet another affirmance of the fundamental doctrine of judicial deference that characterizes the
respective roles of the executive and judicial branches.
Legislation that authorizes broad judicial review of exercises
of prosecutorial discretion cannot be reconciled with these precedents. The Court's language on this issue is unequivocal. 0 8 The
potency of the rule of judicial restraint does not depend on the
presence or absence of legislative intent consistent with it. This
is because the rule is derived from the separation of powers
doctrine,.. 9 which is fundamental in the scheme of American
constitutional law."0
The Hyde Amendment, however, authorizes a plan in direct
conflict with these principles. It asks courts to review any number of prosecutorial decisions in order to determine whether a
government action was "vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith.""'
There is no indication that Congress considered separation of
powers arguments at all in the passage of this law. Neither the
statute nor its legislative record contains reference to the Supreme Court decisions discussed above. The debate of the Hyde
Amendment contains no discussion of the separation of powers
doctrine or its concomitant rule requiring judicial deference to
prosecutorial decisions." Congress neither held hearings at
which the Justice Department could have argued these concerns
nor produced any reports expressing its findings as to the appropriate balance of the competing interests implicated by the Hyde
Amendment."' In short, the enactment of the Hyde Amendment

part on an assessment of the relative competence of prosecutors and courts.").
108. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
109. See supra notes 87, 106 and accompanying text.
110. See, e.g., Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) ("[It is a
breach of the National fundamental law if Congress gives up its legislative power

and transfers it to the President, or to the Judicial branch, or if by law it attempts
to invest itself or its members with either executive power or judicial power.").
111. For a discussion of the scope of this language, see infra notes 190-231 and

accompanying text.
112. Representative Rivers's concerns that the Hyde Amendment "would work a
fundamental change in our legal system and . . . pose a substantial obstacle to the
accomplishment of [the Justice Department's] essential mission" were ignored by

Representative Hyde in the floor debate on the measure. 143 CONG. REC. H7786,
H7793 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1997) (statement of Rep. Rivers).
113. See id. at H7791 (statement of Rep. Skaggs).
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completely ignored the serious conflict between the separation of
powers doctrine and its plan to award attorneys' fees against
federal prosecutors. As a consequence, courts should hesitate to
rely on the legislative record when construing the provisions of
the Hyde Amendment and must address the conflicts ignored by
Congress. The next section briefly discusses the distinction between the civil and criminal law. This subject represents the
third conceptual area implicated by the Hyde Amendment
scheme, but ignored by Congress in the law's enactment.
4
The Civil-CriminalDistinction"

During the debate of the Hyde Amendment, opponents complained that the enactment of the measure was rushed and
lacked adequate consideration of critical issues."' Representative Hyde defended his amendment on the ground that because
a scheme for awarding attorneys' fees against the government
had operated successfully in the civil law for seventeen years,
116
his plan would work smoothly in the criminal system as well.
The existence of pronounced differences between the two systems, however, significantly undercuts Hyde's position that the
EAJA can be implemented easily in the criminal law without
additional consideration.
This section discusses two categories of differences between
the civil and criminal paradigms: substantive and procedural.
Distinctions of both substance and process between the civil and
criminal law are as pronounced as they are numerous." 7 Substantively, the civil and criminal systems fundamentally differ in
their respective purposes."' Procedurally, each system is subject

114. The civil-criminal law distinction contemplates philosophical points beyond the
scope of this Note. Because the civil-criminal law distinction is less a jurisprudential
doctrine and more a set of broad systemic differences, this section merely introduces
its relevant aspects, rather than attempts a comprehensive discussion of them. For a
symposium on the civil-criminal distinction and related issues, see Symposium, The
Civil-Criminal Distinction, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1996).
115. See supra notes 112-13 and accompanying text.
116. See 143 CONG. REC. H7786, H7791 (statement of Rep. Hyde).
117. See generally William J. Stuntz, Substance, Process, and the Civil-Criminal
Line, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 1, 3-7 (1996) (detailing the constitutional lines
between criminal and civil law and between substance and process).
118. See infra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
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to its own rules, statutory provisions and constitutional requirements." 9 Neither category of distinctions, however, was considered adequately in the enactment of the Hyde Amendment.
Substantive Distinctions
The purposes of the civil and criminal systems vary greatly.
Simply put, the purpose of the civil law is to compensate individual injuryY2° The criminal law, on the other hand, seeks to pro-

tect the public through the punishment of wrongdoing. 21 The
civil system narrowly protects individual interests, whereas, the
criminal system broadly protects the public at large.'2 2 Furthermore, civil suits are, for the most part, initiated by individuals3
primarily interested in receiving monetary compensation, 2
while criminal prosecutions are brought by the government itself
to further the more ambiguous goals of effective public safety
and the administration of justice.'24 Consequently, the initiation
and litigation of criminal charges, i.e., the purview of the prosecutor, are subject to a broader range of considerations than are

those of civil claims.'2 5
The prosecutor has a special function in the criminal justice
system that exceeds that of merely winning cases. Justice
Sutherland best explained this role:
119. See infra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
120. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
2, at 7 (5th ed. 1984) ("The civil action ...
is commenced and maintained by the
injured person, and its primary purpose is to compensate for the damage suffqred,
at the expense of the wrongdoer."); 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCO'TT, JR.,
SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.3, at 17 (1986) ("he function of tort law is to compensate someone who is injured for the harm he has suffered.").
121. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 120, at 7 ("The purpose of [a criminal prosecution] is to protect and vindicate the interests of the public as a whole by punishing. . . ."); LAFAVE & SCOTr, supra note 120, at 17 ("The aim of the criminal
law ...
is to protect the public against harm, by punishing harmful results of conduct or at least situations (not yet resulting in actual harm) which are likely to
result in harm if allowed to proceed further.").
122. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 120, at 7.
123. See id.
124. See LAFAVE & SCOTT, supra note 120, at 17 ("With crimes, the state itself
brings criminal proceedings to protect the public interest but not to compensate the
victim; with torts, the injured party himself institutes proceedings to recover damages . . . ." (footnote omitted)).
125. See infra notes 126-27 and accompanying text.
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The United States Attorney is the representative not of an

ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty whose
obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two fold aim of which is
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. 6
The Supreme Court has recognized that the myriad factors that
form the basis of prosecutorial decisions are not easily reduced
into reviewable terms.27 Accordingly, a plan imposing financial
penalties, such as attorneys' fees, upon the prosecuting authority
for bringing improper claims is a questionable proposition because such would compel courts to review the propriety of the
prosecutor's judgments. Unlike the criminal context, the award
of attorneys' fees and its concomitant deterrent effect on the
bringing of improper claims is conceptually consistent with the
goals of the civil system, the principal concern of which is the
balancing of pecuniary interests." A law authorizing awards of
attorneys' fees against the prosecuting authority, therefore, must
duly recognize the tensions implicated by both the special role of
the prosecutor and the differing goals of the criminal and civil
systems.
The proponents of the Hyde Amendment, however, evinced no
recognition of these disparities. At the time the House of Representatives approved the Hyde Amendment, the measure was
virtually identical to the civil EAJA, most importantly with
respect to the standard for awards and the burden of proof. 9
Eventually, the conference committee changed the standard for

126. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), overruled on other grounds by

Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
127. See supra note 102 and accompanying text. For further discussion of these

factors, see Lance M. Afick, ProsecutorialDiscretion:Striking a Balance, 36 LA. B.J.
16, 16-19 (1988).
128. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 120, § 3, at 15 ("[The tort law's] primary pur-

pose, of course, is to make a fair adjustment of the conflicting claims of the litigating parties.").
129. See supra note 8.
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awards and burden of proof,130 most likely yielding to threats of
an executive veto of the entire appropriations bill.13 ' As will be
discussed extensively in the third section of this Note, the
breadth of the revised standard still fails to give due recognition
to the important interests threatened by the Hyde Amendment's
scheme."82 For now, a brief introduction to the language of the
standard will suffice.
The Hyde Amendment authorizes a court to award attorneys'
fees against the United States if it finds that the position of the
government was "vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith."' This
standard differs from that under the Hyde Amendment's civil
counterpart, the EAJA, which demands that the government's
position be "substantially justified" if it is to avoid a financial
penalty." The Hyde Amendment standard, however, finds its
origin in the common law of civil awards of attorneys' fees. The
"vexatious" and "bad faith" standards are merely the Supreme
Court's elaborations on the previously discussed, 13 5 common law
exceptions to the American rule.3" Similarly, "frivolous" has long
been the standard for awards of attorneys' fees to prevailing
defendants in civil rights litigation.3 7 Accordingly, it cannot be
maintained that the transformation of the Hyde Amendment's
standard from "substantially justified" to "vexatious, frivolous,
or in bad faith" was a response to the special considerations

130. See supra note 8; infra note 217 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 12 and accompanying text; infra note 216 and accompanying
text.
132. See infra notes 152-231 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 8.
135. See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
136. See F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974) ("We
have long recognized that attorneys' fees may be awarded to a successful party when
his opponent has acted in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons ...

" (emphasis added)).

137. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978) (holding
that courts may award attorneys' fees to prevailing defendants under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 upon a finding that plaintiffs action was "frivolous, unreasonable,
or without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith"). When enacting the EAJA, the 96th Congress used this standard as a frame of reference to
formulate the "substantially justified" standard. See HI. REP. No. 96-1418, at 10, 14
(1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.CAN. 4984, 4988-89, 4992-93.
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raised by the amendment's unprecedented application to the
criminal context. 3
ProceduralDistinctions
The most pronounced procedural line separating the civil and
criminal systems is a constitutional one. The United States
Constitution offers sweeping protections to criminal defendants,
while extending relatively few protections to civil litigants.3 9
The constitutional law of criminal procedure "has the look of a
code designed for comprehensive coverage" while the rest of the
spectrum of constitutional law "is much more vague and openended and applies much more rarely."1' Because the Constitution itself provides so few protections in matters of civil procedure, the need for attorneys' fees statutes in the civil system is
not surprising. By the same token, in light of the numerous
constitutional restraints already placed on the prosecuting authority, the need for similar statutes in the criminal context is
dubious.
The 105th Congress's approach to the Hyde Amendment was
flawed not in its recognition of a need for awards of attorneys'
fees in the criminal context in the face of significant pre-existing
protections, but rather in its complete failure to explicate the

138. This transformation has no clear explanation. See United States v. Gardner,
23 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1288 (N.D. Okla. 1998) ("There is little history to explain the
transformation of Representative Hyde's original proposed amendment into its present form."). Presumably the change was a concession to the Hyde Amendments
opponents, who wanted the standard to require a showing of subjective bad faith on
the part of the Government. See 143 CONG. REC. H7786, H7792 (daily ed. Sept. 24,
1997) (statement of Rep. Skaggs) ("Were the words 'malicious' and 'abusive' in [Representative Hyde's] amendment, and maybe those are criteria that also ought to be
introduced, it would be a different matter. Those were not standards that are in his
amendment although they were certainly the standards invoked in his rhetoric."); see
also infra notes 210-18 and accompanying text (discussing whether the language
change was a meaningful concession with respect to this requirement).
139. See Stuntz, supra note 117, at 1 ("Criminal procedure is almost completely
constitutionalized; civil procedure is not."). Stuntz notes that criminal defendants
enjoy protections with respect to searches and seizures, self-incrimination, right to
counsel, disclosure of exculpatory evidence, jury selection, equal protection, rules of
evidence, right of confrontation, double jeopardy and general due process considerations that are unequaled in the civil law. See id at 3-4.
140. Id. at 3.
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balance it struck, if any, with respect to those protections.14 ' As
a result, Congress's omissions have left the courts without guidance as to how to harmonize the broad and ambiguous authorization of the Hyde Amendment with pre-existing rights enjoyed
by criminal defendants. Congress may have intended that the
EAJA guide judicial application of the Hyde Amendment, but if
this is the case, it failed to recognize that the EAJA is worthless
to courts in achieving this harmony because the EAJA in no way
implicates issues of constitutional criminal procedure.'4 2
In summary, the three-fold failure of Congress to recognize
and resolve areas of profound conflict between the Hyde Amendment and fundamental legal principles raises serious doubts as
to whether Congress rationally approved this measure. As introduced earlier, these omissions in the legislative process create
significant problems with respect to judicial interpretation of the
Hyde Amendment. In order to appraise fully these problems, a
brief discussion of the general rules of statutory interpretation is
appropriate.
Statutory Interpretationand the Hyde Amendment
It is well-established that courts must begin statutory analysis with the text of the statute.' "All judicial approaches to
statutory interpretation are framed by the constitutional truism
that the judicial will must bend to the legislative command."' If
the language is plain, "the sole function of the courts is to en-

141. The only indication that Congress struck a balance is a single sentence pertaining to a single issue implicated by this discussion. In its brief treatment of the
Hyde Amendment, the House Conference Committee report on the Commerce, Justice
and State appropriations bill provided, "[tihe conferees understand that a grand jury
finding of probable cause to support an indictment does not preclude a judge from
finding that the government's position was vexatious, frivolous or in bad faith." H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 105-405, at 194 (1997).
142. See infra notes 152-89 and accompanying text (discussing the consequences of
the lack of guidance to courts in this area).
143. See Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 485 (1917) ("It is elementary
that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language
in which the act is framed . . .).
144. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, AN INTRODUCTION TO STATUTORY INTERPRETA-

TION AND THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 4 (1997).
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force it according to its terms."' When the answer to a question
of statutory interpretation is not clear from the plain meaning,
judges often must resort to use of the legislative history.'
At the very least, the propriety of judicial use of legislative
materials as evidence of congressional intent is unsettled. Critics
of judicial use of legislative history maintain that it is undemocratic147 and unreliable.' As a matter of course, judges should
be cautious in making use of legislative history when giving
meaning to the indistinct language of a statute.'4 9
Some legislative materials are less probative of legislative
intent than others. Criticism has been specifically directly toward the value of floor debates because they are notoriously
unreliable sources of Congress's intent 50 The unreliability of

* 145. Caminetti, 242 U.S. at 485.
146. See MIIKVA & LANE, supra note 144, at 22.

147. See Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 191-92 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Committee reports, floor speeches, and even colloquies between Congressmen . . . are frail substitutes for bicameral vote upon the text of a law and its
presentment to the President."); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of

Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371, 375 ("Legislative materials . . . at best can
shed light only on the 'intent' of that small portion of Congress in which such records originate; they therefore lack the holistic 'intent' found in the statute itself.").
148. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 144, at 30. But see Patricia M. Wald, The
Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing Statutes in the 1988-89
Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 306 (1990)
("[L]egislative history is the authoritative product of the institutional work of the
Congress. It records the manner in which Congress enacts its legislation, and it
represents the way Congress communicates with the country at large.").
149. See MIKVA & LANE, supra note 144, at 33.
150. See Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 35 n.15 (1982) ("The contemporaneous
remarks of a sponsor of legislation are certainly not controlling in analyzing legislative history." (citations omitted)); Eric Lane, Legislative Process and Its -JudicialRendering, 48 U. PrIT. L. REV. 639, 649 (1987) ("[Most statements on the floor do not
relate to the deliberative process ....
but politically to their constituents and interest groups. Occasionally, however, there will be an actual floor debate in which
an analysis of the bill is undertaken."). As discussed earlier, Representative Hyde's
floor statements in support of his amendment were closer to the former
characterization than the latter because he failed to analyze the substantive implications of the law, instead, settling for rhetoric presumably calculated to play upon
widespread fear of and disdain for federal law enforcement. See supra notes 15-17
and accompanying text.
The absence of a committee report on the Hyde measure weighs in against the
use of legislative history to resolve critical ambiguities under the law. See Thornburg
v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43 n.7 (1986) ("We have repeatedly recognized that the
authoritative source for legislative intent lies in the Committee Reports on the bill."
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floor debates in this regard is of special concern to the present
discussion because the entire legislative history of the Hyde
Amendment consists of a single, thirty-minute floor debate.
Based on the foregoing discussion, the conclusion is unavoidable that the legislative record of the Hyde Amendment is of
virtually no value to courts in interpreting that statute. Not only
is it of questionable value for the same reasons as are all legislative materials, especially floor debates, but also in light of the
circumstances of the Hyde Amendments enactment. The statements of Representative Hyde in the floor debate were highly
rhetorical and lacking any substantive discussion of the problems implicated by his proposal.' 5 ' The 105th Congress enacted
the amendment in a headlong and indiscriminate manner in an
environment of nominal opposition resulting from the political
appeal of the measure and the demonization of federal law enforcement agencies. As a result, the enactment of the Hyde
Amendment left unresolved the serious conflicts between its
aims and fundamental legal doctrines reflected in the Constitution and the decisions of the Supreme Court. These ambiguities
create a danger that, should the courts fail to recognize the
implications of these conflicts when interpreting the Hyde
Amendment, the significant interests embodied in these legal
doctrines will go unrealized. For example, when resolving critical statutory questions under the Hyde Amendment, courts may
erroneously rely upon its deficient, in quality and quantity,
legislative history. If, in interpreting the amendment, courts do
not address these significant doctrinal interests, as Congress
failed to do, these issues will be forever neglected to the detriment of executive law enforcement agencies and, hence, to the
public at large.

(citations omitted)).
151. Indeed, the statements of Representative Hyde reflect an almost deliberate
indifference to the complexities of his plan. Responding to calls from opponents for
hearings and reports on the mbasure, Representative Hyde stated, "This is about as
simple a concept as there is. We have had [the EAJA] and we have been satisfied
with it in civil litigation. I am simply applying the same situation to criminal litigation." 143 CONG. REc. H7786, H7793 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Hyde).
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JuDIcIAL PERPETUATION OF THE FOLLY

This section examines recent district court decisions in which
courts have erroneously approached the interpretation of the
Hyde Amendment.15 2 Specifically, this section focuses on cases in
which courts have run afoul of the dangers just introduced;
these courts have placed near exclusive reliance on the legislative history in interpreting the provisions of the attorneys' fees
law. Treating the sweeping language of the Hyde Amendment's
floor debate as dispositive of important questions of interpretation, the decisions of these courts provided little, if any, substantive analysis of the important issues implicated by the scheme,
while paving the way for broad application of the statute. The
courts, thus, repeated the failure of Congress to account adequately for the serious doctrinal conflicts discussed in the second
section. As will be discussed, the expansive meanings given the
Hyde Amendment's provisions by these decisions pose serious
threats to effective law enforcement.
Interpretationsof the Hyde Amendment's ProceduralProvisions
In United States v. Gardner," one of the first reported decisions to interpret the Hyde Amendment, the district court fell
prey to the lure of legislative history as a substitute for independent judicial analysis. In Gardner,the IRS investigated, and the
United States Attorney's Office later prosecuted, a defendant tax
preparer for numerous violations of the tax law.1" Shortly before
a hearing on the defendant's motion to dismiss, the government
sought dismissal of the charges without prejudice. The court
dismissed three counts with prejudice and the remaining fifteen
counts without prejudice.1"' Subsequently, the defendant sought
152. The Hyde Amendment contains numerous provisions for courts to interpret.
For the purposes of this discussion, these are divided into procedural and substantive provisions. Procedural provisions primarily refer to the "pursuant to the procedures and limitations" language of the Hyde Amendment ahd involve the applicability of the law to a given set of facts. Substantive provisions refer to the law's standard for awards, that is, 'vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith." Pub. L. No. 105-119,
§ 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997).
153. 23 F. Supp. 2d 1283 (N.D. Okla. 1998).
154. See id. at 1285-86.
155. See id.
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an award of attorneys' fees under the Hyde Amendment in the
amount of $108,332.91.156
The government opposed the defendant's claims on numerous
procedural grounds. First, it argued that the defendant was not
a "prevailing party" under the Hyde Amendment because the
government had the authority to reindict him and that dismissal
without prejudice might rest on factors other than the
government's improper behavior.15 Second, the government
argued that the dismissal was not a "final judgment," and therefore, defendant's claim was premature." Third, and finally, the
government urged that the defendant's claim should be barred
because of his failure to demonstrate his qualification for an
award by asserting that his net worth was under the jurisdictional amount. 5 9 Faced with these procedural questions, the
court sought the answers by reference to the legislative record of
the Hyde Amendment's enactment.
Although the court initially noted the "sparse legislative history with respect to the Hyde Amendment,"' 6 it proceeded to examine what little legislative record exists, focusing particularly
on the floor debate.' 6 ' After excerpting the more rhetorical portions of Representative Henry Hyde's speech, the court held:
Based on these statements, and without any evidence of legislative intent to the contrary, the Court believes that Repre-

sentative Hyde's intent in introducing this measure was to
import the Equal Access to Justice Act to the fullest extent
possible to the criminal context. This view will guide the
156. See id.
157. See id. at 1290.
158. See id. The Gardner court interpreted the Hyde Amendment as incorporating
the time limit for filing claims under the EAJA, which provides:
[a] party seeking an award of fees and other expenses shall, within thirty days of final judgment in the action, submit to the court an application for fees and other expenses which shows that the party is a prevailing party and is eligible to receive an award under this subsection.
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (1994) (emphasis added).
159. See Gardner, 23 F. Supp. 2d. at 1292-93. The Gardner court also interpreted
the Hyde Amendment as incorporating the eligibility requirements under the EAJA,
which limits fee awards to "an individual whose net worth did not exceed $2,000,000
at the time the civil action was filed." 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(B).
160. Gardner, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
161. See id. at 1287-89.
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Court's consideration of each of the contested provisions of
the Amendment under the standard rules of statutory construction.162
Consistent with its expansive view of the scope of the Hyde
Amendment, the court interpreted, with only perfunctory analysis, each of the contentious procedural provisions in the
defendant's favor.
The court's disposition of the "final judgment" issue offers an
especially troubling example of the use of dubious legislative history as compelling authority. The government argued that a
decision of the Supreme Court, which held that dismissal of
charges without prejudice is not a "final judgment,""6 coupled
with the fact that it could easily reindict, precluded a finding
there had been a final judgment in the defendant's case. Ignoring this precedent, the court found that the dismissal without
prejudice was a final judgment under the Hyde Amendment.'
The court attempted to justify its departure from precedent and
sound reasoning on the notion that to rule in favor of the government would be "inconsistent with both logic and the purpose
behind the statute, which is to deter vexatious governmental
conduct."165
The approach of the court was erroneous insofar as it treated
the legislative history of the Hyde Amendment as the touchstone
of statutory interpretation. The court failed to examine independently and critically the implications of the Hyde Amendment
within the context of established legal doctrine. For example, the
court presumed that Congress intended the Hyde Amendment to
apply "to [the] fullest extent possible" in the absence of "evidence
of legislative intent to the contrary." This notion flies in the face
of the Alyeska Pipeline holding that federal courts are not permitted to extend departures from the American rule and sovereign immunity doctrine without specific statutory guidance. 6 6
The Supreme Court, it seems, requires the presence of evidence

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id. at 1289 (emphasis added).
See id. at 1292 (citing Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 518 (1956)).
See id. at 1292-93.
Id. at 1292.
See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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of legislative intent in the affirmative before it would permit a
court to ignore precedents and sound opposing1 67arguments, and
apply an attorneys' fees law to its outer limits.

Further, the court gave no recognition to the Hyde
Amendment's implication of the separation of powers doctrine or
of issues pertaining to the civil-criminal distinction. The court
apparently assumed that Congress dutifully pondered these
issues in the enactment of the Hyde Amendment and struck a
reasonable balance of the interests.' As discussed above, however, such was not the case. In short, the Gardner court perpetuated the same faults of Congress in its attempt to delineate the
scope of the Hyde Amendment's procedural provisions.
The decision in United States v. Ranger Electronic Communications, Inc.'69 further illustrates the potential for uncritical judicial adoption of the Hyde Amendment's floor debate as dispositive authority in the interpretation of key procedural provisions.
The Ranger court's approach, however, was even more misguided than that in Gardner because Ranger relied on the Hyde
Amendment's dubious legislative record not merely to reach to
its literal limits of law, but to exceed them.
In Ranger, the underlying action was a prosecution of defendants, the executives of an electronics company, for alleged violations of FCC laws pertaining to the importation of illegal radios. ° During trial, the government's chief witness admitted to
lying to the United States about bank records, which were relevant to the witness' credibility, in order to avoid cross-examination concerning those records." Following this disclosure, some
defendants accepted plea agreements providing for the dismissal
of certain charges against them with prejudice.'7" Soon after, the
defendants discovered the existence of exculpatory evidence in
Thus, the defendants sought
internal FCC memoranda.'
attorneys' fees under the Hyde Amendment because the govern-

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
See Gardner, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1289.
22 F. Supp. 2d 667 (W.D. Mich. 1998).
See id. at 669-70.
See id.
See id. at 670-71.
See id. at 671-73.
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ment failed to disclose this exculpatory evidence as required by
law.174
The court was required to interpret the Hyde Amendment's
time limitation because a dispute arose as to whether the defendants had filed a timely claim under the law."7 The Hyde
Amendment does not speak explicitly to time limits; rather, it
adopts the "procedures and limitations" of the EAJA. 176 One of
the limiting provisions of the EAJA states that claims for
attorneys' fees must be filed within thirty days of a final judgment from which there is no appeal. 1 77 The defendants in Ranger
failed to file within this period of time, but argued that this
delay was due to the government's underlying failure to disclose
materials.178
Presumably, the plain meanings of both the Hyde Amendment
and the EAJA preclude an award in the case of a late filing. The
Ranger court, however, held that the explicit thirty-day time
limitation in the EAJA did not apply to claims under the Hyde
Amendment, despite the latter law's adoption of the former's
"procedures and limitations." 179 The court surmised that the
"EAJA time limitation works differently in criminal cases," due
to the interplay of the double jeopardy clause.'8 0 The court, thus,
faced a fundamental problem clearly resulting from Congress's
failure to account adequately for the civil-criminal distinction in
enacting the Hyde Amendment. As discussed above, Congress
provided no guidance to the courts as to-what EAJA "procedures
and limitations" would carry over to the criminal context, let
alone how the courts should reconcile the ones that do transfer
with the unique concepts of criminal procedure such as double
181
jeopardy.
The court resolved the conflict by altogether eliminating the
thirty-day provision. As in Gardner, the court based this falla-

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See id.
See id. at 675-76.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
See Equal Access to Justice Act § 1(d)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B) (1994).
See Ranger, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 675.
See id. at 674-75.
Id.at 674
See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.

19991

POWER, POLICY, AND THE HYDE AMENDMENT

369

cious decision entirely on a liberal use of the Hyde Amendment's
legislative record.18 2 As a result, the court rejected the thirty-day
time limit in favor of a rule of reason in cases in which the government fails to disclose evidence."8
The court claimed that canons of interpretation further buttressed its reasoning.' The general principles relied upon by
the court in reaching its broad interpretation included the notions that: "all statutes should be read fully and interpreted
judiciously rather than mechanically,"' 85 "remedial statutes
should be interpreted in accordance with their remedial
purposes,"18 6 and the "'cardinal principle of statutory construction is to save and not to destroy."187 Conspicuously absent
from the court's reasoning is any recognition of the specific principles provided in Alyeska Pipeline and the Wayte line of cases.
As discussed earlier, those decisions mandate the exercise of
judicial restraint in departing from the American rule and in
reviewing the propriety of prosecutorial decisions. In other
words, the court ignored the pertinent case law and, instead,
based its departure from the plain meaning of the Hyde Amend8
ment upon malleable canons of statutory interpretation. 1

182. See Ranger, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 675 ('The legislative history of the Amendment
supports the creation of a limited extension of the application period in such a circunstance.").
183. See id. Even if it is assumed that reliance on the Hyde Amendments floor
debate is proper, the court failed to point out that proponents of the Hyde Amendment argued that one of its strengths was adopting the established limitations of
the EAJA. See 143 CONG. REC. H7786, H7791 (daffy ed. Sept. 24, 1997) (statement
of Rep. Hyde) ("IThat is the law, and it has been the law for 17 years. There are
cases interpreting it...
and we have had 17 years of successful interpretation and
reinforcement of that law.").
184. See Ranger, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 675. See generally MIKVA & LANE, supra note
144, at 23-24 ("Canons of construction are judicially crafted maxims for determining
the meaning of statutes.... Canons expressly intend to limit judicial discretion by
rooting interpretive decisions in a system of aged and shared principles from which
a judge may draw a 'correct', unchallengeable rule of 'how to read. (quoting Karl N.
Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rule or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REv. 395, 399 (1950))).
185. Ranger, 22 F. Supp. 2d at 675 (citing Connecticut v. National Bank of
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 255 n.1 (1992)).
186. Id. (citing County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 178 (1981)).
187. Id. (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937)).
188. Critics have observed that "canons are not a system or body of principles that
provide the 'correct reading,' but are a grab bag of individual rules, from which a
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These flawed -interpretations of the procedural provisions of
the Hyde Amendment demonstrate the consequences of the
105th Congress's failure to address adequately the full implications of the law. The sheer number and complexity of the statutory questions left open to judicial interpretation invalidates
Representative Hyde's presumption that application of the EAJA
to the criminal context "is about as simple a concept as there
is."189 That the first judicial interpretations of the law have resulted in departures from precedent and in judicially fashioned
exceptions to the plain meaning of the statute, based entirely on
dubious legislative history and flexible "canons," is evidence of
the serious problems inherent in the application of the Hyde
Amendment. Having failed to provide adequate guidance, Congress has left the courts to rely upon inferior tools to carry out a
forbidden mission: the autonomous circumscription of a policy
that conflicts with established legal doctrines.
The Hyde Amendment's Substantive Standard
Defining the Standard
Under the Hyde Amendment, a court may award attorneys'
fees to eligible claimants if it finds the position of the government to be "vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith" (hereinafter
"the standard"). The precise meaning of this standard is not
clear from either the statute itself or its legislative history. As
discussed above, the legislative record consisted almost exclusively of the floor debate of the proposed amendment.1 90 Recall,
however, that the debate discussed a completely different standard and that little information exists as to the transformation
of the proposed language into the ultimate standard.1 91 Consequently, the legislative history provides little guidance in defining the standard.

judge can choose to support his or her view of the case." MIKVA & LANE, supra note
144, at 25; see Llewellyn, supra note 184, at 401 ("[There are two opposing canons
on almost every point.").
189. 143 CONG. REC. H7793 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
190. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
191. See supra note 8.
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Reference to the 96th Congress's enactment of the EAJA supplies some information pertaining to the Hyde Amendment's
standard. The 96th Congress fashioned a new yardstick for
attorneys' fees awards and, unlike the 105th Congress, explained where that standard fell on the known spectrum of established legal paradigms.1 92 According to the 96th Congress, the
"substantially justified" measure rested between an automatic
award and the standard under civil rights statutes. 193 Judicial
interpretations of civil rights statutes yielded language identical
to the "frivolous" and "vexatious" standards of the Hyde Amendment. 94 Similarly, other court decisions, explicating the common-law rules for civil awards of attorneys' fees, have established meanings for "vexatious" and "bad faith."'9 5 These decisions should be useful in defining the standard under the Hyde
Amendment.
In fixing the "substantially justified" standard under the
EAJA, the 96th Congress used the Supreme Court's decision in
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC,'96 as a frame of reference. "9' 7 In Christiansburg,the Supreme Court, attempting to
formulate the proper standard for attorneys' fees awards under
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, reviewed the interpretations of two
courts of appeals.19 8 The courts of appeals held, respectively, that
courts should determine whether the action was 'unfounded,
meritless, frivolous or vexatiously brought,"" and whether the
192. The "substantially justified" standard of the EAJA.
isa new one ... intended to serve as a "middle ground" between an
automatic award of fees to a successful party and permitting fees only
where the governmenfs position was arbitrary or frivolous.... The
standard falls in between the common law "bad faith" exception and an
automatic award of attorney's fees to prevailing parties.
Berman v. Schweiker, 531 F. Supp. 1149, 1153-54 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (emphasis added),
affd, 713 F.2d 1290 (7th Cir. 1983).
193. See id.
194. See Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978).
195. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257-59
(1975).
196. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
197. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1418, at 10, 14 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4984, 4988-89, 4992-93.
198. See Christiansburg,434 U.S. at 420-21.
199. Id. (quoting United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 519 F.2d 359, 363 (3d
Cir. 1975)).
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action was "'unreasonable, frivolous, meritless or vexatious."'2 0
The Court concluded that the concept embodied in the two standards was correct and held that lower courts could award
attorneys' fees under the statute upon a finding that the litigaeven
tion was "frivolous, unreasonable, or without
201 foundation,
though not brought in subjective bad faith."
In another case, however, the Court held that under a common-law exception to the American rule, judges may award
attorneys' fees when the losing party has "acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons."20 2 Unfortunately, these decisions do not establish a clear, workable definition.
Instead, the opinions reiterate the same set of abstract words,20 3
as if trying to conjure up a meaningful and definite standard by
incantation.
Courts face this same problem in the context of determining
whether appeals are frivolous and, therefore, violative of the
rules of procedure. It has been noted that:
[Tihe definition of a frivolous appeal is a basic question that
confronts a court when determining whether to impose a
sanction.... Unfortunately, ... "[firivolity, like obscenity, is

often difficult to define." To a certain degree the courts of
appeals have dealt with frivolous appeals by doing little more
than describing what they see and labeling it as frivolous."°
Because this type of language defies clear judicial definition, the
standard under the Hyde Amendment, like similar standards in
other contexts, grants judges considerable discretion when applying it to a given set of facts.
200. Id. (quoting Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535 F.2d 722, 727 (2d Cir. 1976)).
201. Id.
202. F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974), noted in
Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 257 (1975).
203. See Christiansburg,434 U.S. at 421. This approach seeks to define legal standards by repeatedly describing them in different terms, without reference to legal
authorities. For instance, in a recent case interpreting the Hyde Amendments substantive standard, the district court used quotes from Merriam-Webster's definitions
of "vexatious" and "frivolous" to construct its test for determining liability, without
reference to substantive legal authority. See United States v. Holland, 34 F. Supp.
2d 346, 359-60 (E.D. Va. 1999).
204. Robert J. Martineau, Frivolous Appeals: The Uncertain Federal Response, 1984
DUKE L.J. 845, 850.
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The Supreme Court's holding in Pierce v. Underwood 5 supports this conclusion. Faced with a circuit-split as to the standard of review under the EAJA, the Court held that the appropriate question in reviewing a lower court finding that the position of the government was not "substantially justified" was
whether the lower court abused its discretion."° In rejecting a de
novo standard, the Court placed great faith in the accuracy of
the trial judge's decisions. °7 Most importantly, the Court established the "deferential" abuse of discretion standard due to its
recognition of the "'sheer impracticability of formulating a rule
of decision for the matter in issue. Many questions that arise in
litigation are not amenable to regulation by rule because they
involve multifarious, fleeting, special, narrow facts that utterly
resist generalization."'2 "8 In short, the Supreme Court held that
the substantive standard under the EAJA granted the courts
considerable discretion that would not ordinarily be subject to
review.
Cases interpreting the Hyde Amendment have yet to reach
the appellate level, therefore, the question is open as to the
appropriate standard of appellate review. The kinship between
the Hyde Amendment and the EAJA, however, suggests that the
Pierce holding will be applied to the Hyde Amendment milieu. If
this occurs, the scope of judicial discretion under the Hyde
Amendment would, indeed, be sweeping.
The Requirement of Subjective Bad Faith
Before turning to the implications of the Hyde Amendment's
sweeping grant of judicial discretion, it is important to discuss
one further issue relevant to the definition of the standard. The
Hyde Amendment's inquiry into the conduct of the government
raises the concomitant issue of whether a court must decide that
the government acted with subjective bad faith in order to find a
violation under the measure.2 °9 Not surprisingly, the statute is
205. 487 U.S. 552 (1988).
206. See id. at 559.
207. See id. at 559-60.
208. Id. at 561-62 (quoting Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial
Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 662 (1971)).
209. This issue is implicated in other contexts in which similar standards apply.
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silent on this point and, consistent with its level of guidance in
other matters, leaves the resolution of this issue up to the
courts. A number of courts have held that the absence of subjective bad faith is not a bar to awards under the Hyde Amendment.21° The Supreme Court's interpretation of the civil rights
law standard in Christiansburgostensibly supports the conclusion that the Hyde Amendment is an objective rather than a
subjective standard.21 '
The Hyde Amendment's legislative record, however, raises
doubts about the accuracy of this conclusion. 2 During the floor
debate, Representative Hyde pointed to situations of "malicious"
and "willfully wrong" government prosecutions as forming the
basis for the proposed law. 1 These words describe conduct with
a subjective component of intent or bad faith. Presumably conSee, e.g., Martineau, supra note 204, at 854 (discussing the requirement of subjective
bad faith in the area of frivolous appeals).
210. See United States v. Holland, 34 F. Supp. 2d 346, 360 (E.D. Va. 1999) (establishing as a substantive standard that the government "should have known" that
its conduct was of a particular improper character); United States v. Gardner, 23 F.
Supp. 2d 1283, 1293 (N.D. Okla. 1998) (citing with approval Christiansburg Garment
Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412, 421 (1978)), United States v. Ranger Elec. Communications, Inc., 22 F. Supp. 2d 667, 673-74, 676 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (holding that when
the government's alleged "bad faith" is its failure to disclose exculpatory evidence,
subjective bad faith is not required); United States v. Troisi, 13 F. Supp. 2d 595,
596 (N.D. W. Va. 1998) ("[IUn the law enforcement context, bad faith' includes a
'reckless disregard for the truth.' (quoting Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 171
(1978))).
For a discussion of subjective and objective standards, see Flaherty v. Flaherty,
646 P.2d 179, 186-87 (Cal. 1982).
211. See supra notes 196-201 and accompanying text.
212. One purpose of this Note has been to expose the faults ofjudicial reliance on
the legislative history in resolving questions under the Hyde Amendment. This discussion uses the legislative history only to inform the issue of the subjective bad
faith requirement, rather than to resolve it.
213. 143 CONG. REC. H7786, H7791 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1997) (statement of Rep.
Hyde) ("[I]f [the prosecution] was an abuse of process, if it was frivolous, if it was
malicious, then the victim, the defendant who has prevailed, is entitled to attorney's
fees, . . . What if Uncle Sam sues you,... but they are wrong. They are not just
wrong, they are willfully wrong ... you should be entitled to your attorney's fees
reimbursed and the costs of litigation."); see also Legislation Would Pay Fees of Acquitted; Critics Say Defendants like Hinckley, Gotti Would Get Free Lawyers, BALTIMORE SUN, Oct. 24, 1997, at 12A, available in 1997 WL 5535997 [hereinafter Fees of
Acquitted] ("That is your remedy if not this for somebody who has been unjustly,
maliciously, improperly, abusively tried by the government, by the faceless bureaucrats?'") (quoting Rep. Hyde).
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cerned that the ambiguities in the text of the amendment might
lead to doubts as to whether a subjective state of mind was a
necessary element
for awards, Hyde's opponents seized upon his
21 4
statements:
I think the gentleman proves too much. Were the words "malicious" and "abusive" in his amendment, and maybe those
are criteria that also ought to be introduced, it would be a
different matter. Those were not standards that are in his
amendment although they were certainly the standards invoked in his rhetoric. But it is exactly those kinds of questions about which we need a more deliberative examination
of this proposed change than is admitted this evening.215
In short, the statements made by both sides during the debate
suggest that the substantive standard under the Hyde Amendment should be a subjective one.
In fact, the lack of an expressly subjective standard in the
original version of the amendment, the one that passed the
House of Representatives, undoubtedly fueled the Administration's opposition to the Hyde Amendment and triggered its
threats of a veto of the entire appropriations bill. 16 Reporting
the revised standard, the conference committee ambiguously
stated they had reached a compromise resulting in the change
from a "substantially justified" standard to the "vexatious, frivolous, or in bad faith" language.2

7

Whether this compromise

meant that the new language contained a requirement of subjective bad faith is unclear. This question, negligently left open by
Congress, is of critical importance in determining the scope of
the Hyde Amendment. As discussed above, current judicial in214. Recall that during this debate the standard was "substantially justified" as

opposed to "frivolous, vexatious or in bad faith." See supra note 8.
215. 143 CONG. REC. H7786, H7792 (daily ed. Sept. 24, 1997) (statement of Rep.

Skaggs).
216. See id.; Harvey Berkman, The Wrongly Prosecuted May Get Legal Fees Help,
NAT'L L.J., Nov. 24, 1997, at A10 ("The Department of Justice... had pledged to
seek a presidential veto of the legislation to which the rider was attached ... unless the Hyde amendment was dropped.").
217. See supra note 138 and accompanying text; see also Berkman, supra note 216,
at A10 ("But a House-Senate conference committee voted to keep the [Hyde Amendment], and negotiators for Congress and the Justice Department crafted the compromise language.").
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terpretations have rejected the subjective requirement.218 Unfortunately, court decisions rejecting the subjective standard consequently increase the discretion of courts in deciding awards
and, thereby, expand the sweep of the Hyde Amendment.
PersistentProblems
The vagueness and flexibility of the Hyde Amendment's substantive standard, with its attendant grant of broad judicial
discretion, are undesirable for two related reasons. First, this
expansive discretion itself is incompatible with the holdings of
the Supreme Court. The Wayte, Newton, and Armstrong decisions unequivocally prohibit the use of roving judicial authority
to review the propriety of prosecutorial decisions. 219 The fundamental notions of separation of powers dictate that federal
courts possess only narrow authority to review these decisions.22°
The uncertain and permissive substantive standard of the Hyde
Amendment stands in clear contravention of these rules.
Second, and more importantly, the broad judicial discretion
granted by the Hyde Amendments standard, compounded by the
22
vagaries of court interpretations of its procedural provisions, '
increases the scope of the statute to a potentially harmful extent. The effectiveness of the prosecutor in faithfully executing
the laws is essential to the safety and welfare of the public.222
Authorizing roving judicial review of prosecutorial decisions in
the Hyde Amendment may undermine fair and effective law
enforcement by decreasing the resources available for unquestionably valid prosecutions due to expenditures of time and
money in defending against Hyde Amendment claims, 22 requiring disclosure of law enforcement methods and confidential in-

218. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 91-107 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 91-107 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 152-89 and accompanying text.
222. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
223. See Fees of Acquitted, supra note 213; see also Town of Newton v. Rumery,
480 U.S. 386, 395-96 (1987) (discussing the need to protect prosecutors from the
burdens of defending against baseless claims of improper government conduct and
noting that "[prosecutors] must decide how best to allocate the scarce resources of
[the] criminal justice system . . . ").
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formation,2" arbitrarily increasing the incentives for prosecuting
indigents because they are likely ineligible for awards under the
Hyde Amendment,22 and chilling prosecutions overall and particularly in "political" cases. 26
The Gardner decision illustrates the precarious relationship
between expansive judicial review and critical issues of law
enforcement policy. In Gardner, two disputes arose related to
the proper scope of discovery under a Hyde Amendment claim.
First, the parties argued over whether the court's review should
be "limited to objective documentary evidence such as transcripts or pleading or grand jury testimony" as it was under the
EAJA, or whether it extended to evidence "outside the record."
Second, they argued over whether the definition of "position of
the United States" under the Hyde Amendment should be restricted to the government's conduct in the litigation or extended
to reach that of investigating agents prior to the initiation of
formal charges. Although the statute failed to answer clearly
either question, the court resolved both issues against the government, resting its conclusions on the Hyde Amendment's dubious legislative history.2 ' The court also focused on the provision
within the amendment for in camera judicial review of
materials. 28 The court seized upon this provision and compelled
the production of not only all the prosecution's internal documents pertaining to the case, but also those of the investigating
agency. 2 Such broad discovery in cases alleging prosecutorial

224. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996) ("'Examining the
basis of a prosecution .. . may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing
the Government's enforcement policy." (quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S.

598, 607 (1985))).
225. See supra note 71.
226. See Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 465 ("Examining the basis of a prosecution ...
threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and
decisionmaking to outside inquiry ..
" (quoting Wayte, 470 U.S. at 607)); supra
note 31 and accompanying text.
227. See United States v. Gardner, 23 F. Supp. 2d 1283, 1296 (N.D. Okla. 1998)
("[Tihe Hyde Amendment ... contemplates an expansion of the record traditionally
available to the Court for the purpose of assessing an applicant's claim.... There
is nothing in the plain language or the legislative history to support this narrow
view of the Amendment.").

228. See id.
229. See id. at 1295-96.
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misconduct has greatly troubled the Supreme Court, leading it
to require a "substantial threshold showing" before allowing
courts' to compel the prosecution's production of documents. 3 0
This reflects yet another conflict among judicial interpretations
of the competing policies of effective law enforcement and the
Hyde Amendment. As a practical matter, an expansive application of the Hyde Amendment promises to lead to more discovery
demands.31 Consequently, the statute threatens to drain the
government's (both prosecutor's and investigating agencies') time
and resources, not only with respect to the ultimate award of
fees, but also as to forced compliance with discovery orders.
In short, judicial interpretation of the Hyde Amendment implicates myriad problems. The statute raises numerous procedural questions, yet provides little guidance in resolving them.
The defining characteristic of the Hyde Amendment's substantive standard is that it defies definition. Courts that have faced
these problems have taken erroneous approaches to finding
solutions to the puzzle. Confronted with an ambiguous statute,
they have relied on flawed legislative history and upon their
own discretion in defining the parameters of the amendment. At
the same time, the courts have failed to give due recognition to
conflicts between the Hyde Amendment scheme and fundamental legal doctrines. As a result, the courts have perpetuated the
folly of the legislature and, thereby, increased the potential for
significant harm to the essential executive function. What follows are modest recommendations for legislative and judicial
action that will militate against this threatened harm.

230. Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 186 (1992), cited with approval in
Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463.
231. It should be noted that after the court ordered the broad discovery in
Gardner, the government settled the defendant's claim in the amount of $75,000. See
David Harper, Tax PreparerSettles with Government, TULSA WORLD, Jan. 27, 1999,
available in 1999 WL 5388482. This case raises the concern of whether the govern-

ment would simply settle a claim rather than reveal its secrets, thus, injecting an
economic analysis into the mix that would make a Hyde Amendment award turn on

the extent to which the claim hampered the legitimate law enforcement goals, rather
than on its merits.
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RECOMMENDATIONS

A number of steps can be taken to cure the faults of the Hyde
Amendment. First, and most importantly, the legislature must
address the ambiguities implicated by this law.232 In passing the
statute, Congress acted in an indiscriminate manner, leaving a
host of important issues unresolved. The need for guidance in
these areas is great. A revision of the Hyde Amendment would
eliminate many of the problems raised in this Note.
Before turning to specific revisions, however, it must be observed that any reconsideration of the Hyde Amendment should
begin with its basic premise.28 Opponents of the measure doubted whether there was "actually a need for this kind of proposal."234 The need advanced in the floor debate by Representative
Hyde was speculative and vague.' The result was an impossibly broad law that seemingly reached the entire universe of governmental misconduct. By enacting the Hyde Amendment in
such an ambiguous fashion, Congress improperly left all the
important policy decisions to the courts.
To remedy this problem, Congress should hold hearings and
make the policy findings that the courts are prohibited from
doing. After giving interested parties an opportunity to be heard,
Congress should have a more precise understanding of the problem and will be in a better position to enact an efficient and balanced remedy. To be sure, there are many ways to address the
multifarious issue of governmental misconduct. If Congress finds
that indictments are insufficient to protect against baseless
prosecutions, it should retool the grand jury system. 36 If ethical
rules, which already protect against prosecutorial abuse, are
232. It seems that Representative Hyde considered the Judiciary Committee's return to the issues presented by his amendment. See 143 CONG. REC. H7786, H7794
(daily ed. Sept. 24, 1997) (statement of Rep. Hyde) ("That is not to say we will not
deal with it in the Committee on the Judiciary, I am sure we will, but there may

be no need to after it passes.").
233. The basic premise being that the application of attorneys' fees in the criminal

law makes sense.
234. 143 CONG. REC. H7793 (statement of Rep. Rivers).
235. See supra notes 15-21, 26 and accompanying text.

236. See generally Gerald B. Lefcourt, High Time for a Bill of Rights for the Grand
Jury, CHAMPION, Apr. 1998, at 5 (discussing the need for reform of the grand jury

system).
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deficient, Congress should reform them.3 7 Congress should consider alternatives to the Hyde Amendment, such as programs
that promote high ethical standards through financial rewards
8 Alternatives
as opposed to punishmentsY.1
to the Hyde Amend-

ment may be more desirable considering the conceptual conflicts
implicated by the attorneys' fees scheme. At the very least, Congress should exercise its own oversight responsibilities in the
area of prosecutorial misconduct, not abdicate them to the
courts.
If it decides that the Hyde Amendment is worth saving, Congress should consider taking the following steps in revising the
statute. First, rather than have a "catch-all" remedy, Congress
should narrow the statute's application to those specific types of
misconduct that it finds most warrant the attorneys' fees remedy, including, for example, the failure to disclose exculpatory
evidence. Second, Congress should abandon the shortcut
approach

39

to the Hyde Amendment's procedural application

and revise the statute to explicitly provide for its own particular
procedures. Third, Congress should include a sunset provision,
like that of the EAJA, in recognition of the unprecedented nature of awarding attorneys' fees in the criminal context. Fourth,
the legislature should provide guidance to the courts by expressly adopting an objective or subjective standard for triggering
awards. Finally, and most importantly, Congress must responsibly resolve the conceptual conflicts posed by the Hyde Amendment by making express findings regarding the appropriate
balancing of interests, with reference to specific doctrines and
precedents.
The need for responsible legislative reconsideration of the
Hyde Amendment cannot be stressed enough. In the meantime,
237. In the 105th Congress, for instance, Representatives McDade and Murtha
sought to reform the current ethical rules under which federal prosecutors work and
to enhance the enforcement of such rules through legislation dubbed the Citizens

Protection Act. See 144 CONG. REC. E301 (daily ed. Mar. 5, 1998).
238. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with FinancialIncentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851, 852
(1995) ("[A] system of financial rewards could influence the public prosecutor's charging decisions and control prosecutorial misconduct occurring at trial.").
239. This is meant to refer to the Hyde Amendment's vague incorporation of the
EAJA's "procedures and limitations."
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however, courts are placed in the unfortunate position of deciding the many unresolved and important questions raised by the
statute. Fortunately, a proper approach to judicial interpretation
of the Hyde Amendment exists.
The following suggestions should guide a court's analysis of
this statute. First, courts should avoid all substantive use of the
Hyde Amendment's legislative history, let alone its use to support broad applications of the measure. Second, courts must recognize that they are bound by the principles of restraint embodied in the Alyeska and Wayte decisions. When confronted with
an ambiguity under the Hyde Amendment, courts should adhere
to precedent and resolve uncertainties against an award of
attorneys' fees. Third, for their own part, the courts must recognize and resolve the civil-criminal distinctions implicated by the
Hyde Amendment's insertion of a traditionally civil remedy into
the criminal context, rather than erroneously assume that Congress considered these issues. Once again, judicial restraint
should guide the resolution of these distinctions given their
fundamental nature.
Currently, at least one court has interpreted the Hyde Amendment consistent with these recommendations. 2' 4 In United States
v. Reyes, 1 the prevailing defendant, a lobbyist acquitted of
bribery charges, sued the United States for attorneys' fees under

240. In United States v. Holland, 34 F. Supp. 2d 346 (E.D. Va. 1999), the district
court's opinion resolving a Hyde Amendment claim fell short of the mark with respect to the proper approach to interpretation argued in this Note. It is conceded
that the court properly refused to use the slanted and sparse legislative record to
resolve important questions and that the court ultimately cited the Wayte line of
cases as suggesting some measure of judicial restraint. See id. at 360. By the time
the court invoked this restraint, however, it had already interpreted against the
government key questions relating to both the Hyde Amendments "procedures and
limitations" provision and the formulation of its substantive standard. See id. In fact,
the court understood the Wayte line of decisions to require merely judicial restraint
in weighing the evidence. To the contrary, this Note argues that these cases demand
judicial restraint from the beginning of a court's interpretation of the Hyde Amendment. The Hyde Amendment not only grants sweeping judicial discretion in deciding
ultimate questions of fact, but, more importantly, in formulating the antecedent law
that governs the applicable procedural rules and substantive standard under the
attorneys' fees statute. In other words, separation of powers concerns are relevant
from the outset of the inquiry, not merely in the final analysis.
241. 16 F. Supp. 2d 759 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
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the Hyde Amendment.242 The court's disposition of the claim
illustrates the proper approach to interpretation of the statute.
The court used only that portion of the Hyde Amendment's legislative history that clearly answered specific questions, such as
which party bears the burden of proof and what precedents
inform the substantive standard, as opposed to using it wholesale to fill in the statute's major conceptual gaps.' The court
properly avoided use of the sweeping rhetoric of the Hyde
Amendment's floor debate.2 " Most importantly, however, the
Reyes court grounded its approach to the claim in the context of
the precedents discussed above. The court explained, "[in examining [defendant's] motion, the Court notes that case precedent
requires that the Court practice restraint when reviewing prosecutorial decisions."245 After citing the principles of judicial deference embodied in Rumery and Wayte, the court concluded:
"[a]ccordingly, the Court will analyze the Government's decision
to prosecute within the limitations stated above."' In sum,
Reyes provides a useful, model approach for subsequent interpretations of the Hyde Amendment.
CONCLUSION

The Hyde Amendment provides a shameful example of the
type of law that results from the thoughtless and unreflective
exercise of legislative power. In response to a speculative problem, the 105th Congress enacted this sweeping and ill-conceived
initiative. It did so in an atmosphere marked by stifled opposition, a dearth of deliberative process, and little, if any, regard
for the theoretical or practical implications of this unprecedented
scheme to introduce the foreign species of the civil law of attorneys' fees awards into the criminal ecosystem. Along the way,
Congress either failed to grasp, or simply dismissed, the fact
that the essence of its proposal clashed with established law and

242. See id. at 760.

243. See id. at 761.
244.
plain
245.
246.

See id. at 760 (finding that generally there is no need to inquire past the
language of the Hyde Amendment).
Id. at 761.
Id.
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sound public policy. Congress's attempt in one paragraph to
inject revolutionary concepts into the criminal law, using a simple cross-reference to a civil law's procedures and limitations,
demonstrates a "one size fits all" approach that is incongruous
with a proper representative democracy. With its abdication of
the legislative function, Congress has asked the courts to make
the law in areas previously foreclosed to them by the Supreme
Court.
The onus is on the judiciary to serve the people where Congress has failed them. Rather than wield gratuitous, law-making
authority, the courts should narrowly interpret the Hyde
Amendment's procedural and substantive provisions. To do otherwise constitutes a departure from legal norms, unreasonably
threatens effective law enforcement, and places the judiciary's
imprimatur on the deficiency of process by which Congress enacted this law. Only through sound interpretation will the judiciary avoid perpetuation of a legislative folly.

Lawrence Judson Welle

